Greening the Successor: A Quantitative Model of Sovereign Debt Instruments under Government Turnover
Green transitions require sustained investment over decades, while the governments that finance them alternate in power. I study whether sovereign debt design can serve as a commitment device against successor governments with weaker environmental preferences. I develop a sovereign default model with perpetuity bonds, two-type political turnover, and endogenous green capital, and use it to compare three financing regimes, namely conventional bonds, green bonds, and sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs). Conventional bonds carry no environmental feature, green bonds attach a use-of-proceeds label, and SLBs make debt service contingent on a measurable environmental performance indicator. Under an SLB, the government pays a higher coupon if it misses its emissions target, an incentive channel for green investment that conventional and green bonds lack. Under the terms of Chile’s sovereign SLB, the SLB barely changes green investment, emissions or default risk, because the step-up is small and the emissions target lies out of reach. With a larger step-up or a more attainable emissions target, the SLB raises green investment and lowers emissions, and it works mainly by constraining brown governments. A more attainable target achieves this with a smaller step-up and without raising default risk. Annual tests strengthen the SLB further. A target on green capital weakens it, because brown governments are further from meeting it and because its step-up, unlike that of an emissions target, does not fall more often in good times.
Presentations
- Brown Bag Lunch Seminar, Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, 2026
- Fifth PhD Workshop in Money and Finance, Sveriges Riksbank, Stockholm, 2026
- IV PhD Students Seminar on Energy and Environment, Chair of Energy Sustainability, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, 2027 (scheduled)